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JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1958
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF TORTS
By EUGENE S. HAMES AND WILLIAM J. MADDEN
Mr. Haines is a partner and Mr. Madden an associate in the
Denver firm, Wood, Ris and Haines.
During the period of January 1, 1957, to December 31, 1957, a con-
siderable number of cases involving tort questions were decided by the
Colorado Supreme Court. In this article we have selected those cases
which involve unusual factual situations or unusual legal problems not
heretofore decided or well established in this jurisdiction. We have also
tried, insofar as possible, to classify the cases according to subject matter
or type of action. Other cases, which have not been deemed significant
enough for extended discussion have been footnoted and a few have
been omitted entirely.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
In Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Swort,' a truck driver, who
had turned the wheel of his truck over to an incompetent non-employee,
was held entitled to receive the benefits of compensation for injuries
received when the truck collided with another vehicle. The supreme
court, two justices dissenting, held that his injuries arose out of and in
the course of his employment, although the employer had refused to
hire the non-employee because he did not have an operator's license.
The only Colorado case relied upon by the majority is Whiteside v.
Harvey,2 in which the court found the employer liable for injuries to a
third person caused by the negligence of a non-employee driver, applying
the constructive identity doctrine. The dissenting opinion comments
on the inapplicability of the Whiteside case and cites several cases which
would have supported a contrary ruling. The issues involved in the
two cases are not similar. In the Whiteside case the third party could
recover only if the employer on some theory was accountable for the
negligence of the non-employed driver. In the Swort case the issue was
simply whether the claimant had so abandoned the work he was hired
to do that he was no longer engaged in his employment.
In Vanadium Corp. v. Sargent,3 seven questions were decided by
the supreme court, three of which are important enough to be discussed
here. The first question was whether there was sufficient evidence of
causative aggravation of a pre-existing injury to uphold the award of
compensation. In upholding the award the court stated that evidence
of accident coupled with medical testimony that the accident described
"probably" caused present disability and aggravation of pre-existing
injury is sufficient. Second, the court held that the claimant's failure
to follow the statutory procedure 4 in selecting a private physician did
not bar recovery of compensation benefits but did bar recovery of the
expenses of the doctor selected by the employee. The employer, who
had directed the employee to a certain physician, gave the claimant
permission to change doctors, which the claimant did. The court stated
that while the employer waived any objection he might have had, he
could not waive the right of the Commission nor of the insurer to demand
1 134 Colo. 421, 306 P.2d 661 (1957).
2 124 Colo. 561, 239 P.2d 989 (1951).
3 307 P.2d 454 (Colo. 1957).
4 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-12-12 (1953).
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statutory compliance. Third, the court found it was not error to refuse
the employer's and the insurer's right to cross-examine a doctor, who
had submitted a medical report to the Commission, on the basis that
there was no statement in the record that the Commission had admitted
or considered the report. It is interesting, however, to note that the
statute quoted in the opinion," gives any party the right of cross-exami-
nation, if any ex parte evidence is received by the Commission.
In Industrial Commission v. Colorado Fuel and Iron Corp.,6 claim-
ant, in the course of his employment was sitting on an I beam, eighteen
feet above the ground when he suffered cerebral thrombosis. He fell,
suffering burns to his hand and paralysis, resulting in total permanent
disability. A final award of the referee which was sustained by the Com-
mission was for total disability. Both the referee and the Commission
found that the degree of disability resulting from the tall and burns
was fifteen percent as a working unit, which superimposed on the claim-
ant's pre-existing infirmity, had rendered him permanently and totally
disabled. The referee found that paralysis was due to thrombosis, which
was not caused by any condition of his employment, and that this
paralysis rendered him permanently disabled. The district court set the
award aside, claiming there was evidence to sustain it. On appeal, the
cause was reversed and remanded with instructions to the district c*ourt
to return the case to the commission with instructions to enter an award
for fifteen percent total disability. The instructions seem inconsistent
with the remark of the court that: "There is no evidence that the fall
was caused by any condition of the employment or by overwork or
over-exertion in the performance of work..... .Perhaps the inconsist-
ency can be explained, however, by the court's reference to the doctrine
that an injury is compensable if the worker is subjected to unusual risk
due to the position in which he has to work.
In Industrial Commission v. London and Lancashire Indemnity Co.8
the plaintiff's husband was found lying, seriously injured, on the em-
ployer's premises at 5:30 p. in. A window on the fourth floor was open,
all lights in the employer's seven-story building were off, except one on
the first floor and all other windows were closed and bolted. Decedent's
normal working hours had been 8:00 a. in. to 4:30 p. m. The widow and
son, plaintiffs, sought workmen's compensation alleging that the injury
and resulting death "arose out of" and "in the course of" his employ-
ment. The employer contended the workman had committed suicide.
The Commisison, in granting the award, found that the defendant had
failed to establish by conclusive evidence that the decedent had com-
initted suicide. The district court reversed the Commission and on
appeal the reversal was affirmed. The supreme court reiterated that
the claimant is burdened with proving that (1) an accident occurred
and that it (2) arose out of, and (3) in the course of the decedent's
employment. The court further stated that there was nothing in the
compensation act which creates a statutory presumption of accident in
unwitnessed events resulting in a workman's injury oi death and that,
while there is a presumption against suicide, it is not an evidentiary
substitute for (2) and (3) above.
In the case of State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Commis-
aId. § 81-14-3.
6 310 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1957).
7 Id. at 719.
8 311 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1957).
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sion,9 the plaintiff's husband died as a result of injuries received while
playing football for Fort Lewis A. & M. The decedent had been working
part time at a filling station when he enrolled in school, but quit this
work for work at the college having different hours but equivalent pay,
so that he could play football. An award of compensation by the Com-
mission was reversed on appeal. The court held there was no evidence
that the decedent's job was the consideration for his playing football;
therefore, there was no contract to play. If there was no evidence of a
contract, there was no employer-employee relationship upon which com-
pensation could be granted. The court distinguished University of
Denver v. Nemeth1° on the grounds that in the latter case there was
direct evidence presented that the claimant's job was the consideration
for his football playing.
In Industrial Commission v. Newton Lumber & Alfg. Co." claimant
suffered an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employ-
ment. After the employee had been hospitalized for some time, the
employer filed his first report of the accident and the carrier filed its
denial; but the notice of the carrier's denial was never received by tile
employee due to a mistake made by the employer. The employee finally
filed his claim more than six months after the injury.12 The supreme
court reinstated the award, which had been vacated by the district court
9 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957).
10i27 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1957).
1' 314 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1957).
12 Colo. Rex'. Stat. Ann. § 81-13-5 (1953) provides that the right to compensation
shall be barred unless a notice claiming compensation is filed within six months after
the injury.
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finding that the claimant had established a reasonable excuse for tile
late filing. The court stated that since the employer was aware of the
injury and knew the details of the claimant's hospitalization, the em-
ployer was not prejudiced by the late filing of the claim. The court
reaffirmed the rule that the burden of proving prejudice was upon the
employer.
The next two cases are treated together as they both involve claims
allegedly based upon over-exertion. In Industrial Commission v.
Havens,3 the claimant's husband, a truck driver, helped unload the
contents of his truck at its destination. The work took four hours and
involved unusually heavy exertion for him. During this work period,
the decedent's leg was injured when a hand car broke loose and hit
him. He continued working, apparently recovering. After lunch, he
started on his way in the truck. Ten minutes later he was found dead.
No medical examination of his body was made although the coroner
certified the death was caused by "coronary occlusion." The decedent
had no history of heart disease. The claimant introduced no medical
evidence that over-exertion causes coronary occlusion. Defendants, ap-
pealing from the district court's award which set aside the Commission's
denial of award, based their ground for reversal solely on this last point.
The award was affirmed on appeal. First, it should be noted that the
referee judicially noticed that a coronary occlusion does not usually
result from over-exertion. The court stated that if the facts are undis-
puted, the entire question is one of law for the court and that the court
was not bound by the Commission's conclusion. Second, the court, while
admitting that the causal connection between coronary occlusion and
exertion had to be established, held that medical testimony was not
necessary, if the claimant shows "circumstances establishing a reason-
able connection between the over-exertion.., and the subsequent death
by heart failure. ' 113a A concurring opinion summarized the majority's
holding by quoting from other cases, which from timely sequence of
events, creates a presumption of permissible inference of causation, which
the employer must rebut. The dissent by three members of the court
would have denied compensation, on the basis that there was no evidence
offered to establish that the claimant's death was caused by over-exertion.
In Bennett v. Durango Furniture Mart,4 an opinion written by
one of the justices who dissented in the Havens case, the court held that
whether the death of the employee resulted from over-exertion was a
question to be decided by the referee, and that since the evidence was
such that reasonable men could draw different inferences, the referee's
ruling should not be disturbed. The majority distinguished the Havens
case on a factual basis. Apparently the test as to whether there is over-
exertion is whether the claimant or the decedent customarily exerted
himself in his employment in the same manner that he did at the time
of his injury or death. If he was exerting himself in the customary way,
then there is no over-exertion.
13 314 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1957).
1
3
a Id. at 702.
'4 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 118 (1957).
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In the case of Cain v. Industrial Commission," the claimant peti-
tioned the Commission to reopen his case, in which he had originally
been awarded compensation, because he felt his disability had increased
resulting in a change of condition. His doctor advised against additional
surgery, although he did find an increase in disability. The employer's
doctor felt that exploratory surgery was necessary to determine (1)
what should be done and (2) whether any of claimant's disability was
actually attributable to his original injury. The claimant refused the
employer's demand that he submit to exploratory surgery, although he
had co-operated in the past. The supreme court reversed the district
court's denial of additional compensation. The court held that explora-
tory surgery was not contemplated under the applicable statute 16 because
such surgery was not necessarily free of unusual risks and was not calcu-
lated to effect a cure.
Jacobson v. Doan,17 decided that a workman, suing at common law
for injuries resulting from the negligence of employees of the workman's
special employer, was entitled to recover an amount not exceeding
$10,000;18 that the subrogee insurance carrier, which paid compensa-
tion and medical expenses for the general employer, was entitled to a
compensation refund only; and, that the "right of control" test deter-
mined whether the servant was "loaned" to the special employer. The
court held that a defense based on the fellow servant doctrine was taken
away by statute. 9 If the special employer and the employee were both
under workmen's compensation and this had been established at the




In Hailer v. Gross,2 1 the plaintiff, a nineteen-year-old girl, while
riding as a guest in a car driven by the defendant, was injured. For
several hours prior to the accident she had freely participated in a drink-
ing party with the defendant driver and admitted that both she and the
driver were intoxicated at the commencement of the ill-fated trip. She
complained of the driving, but although she had several opportunities
to get out of the car, did not do so. The supreme court in reversing the
trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for directed verdict at the
close of the plaintiff's case, held that the plaintiff had assumed the risk
as a matter of law. The court stated that although the plaintiff was a
minor, she had the usual and ordinary faculties of an adult, which in-
cluded knowing the effect of intoxication on a driver. The court ap-
proved an instruction offered by the defendant which set forth the
defendant's theory that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury and
was contributorily negligent.
The case of Valdez v. Sams," made no mention that it involved the
guest statute, but it did involve the question of wilful and wanton dis-
regard of the rights of others, so we include it here. This is a case of
'5 315 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1957).
16 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 81-12-12 (1953).
17 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 108 (1957).
18 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 80-6-4 (1953).
19 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 80-6-1 (1953).
20 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 81-3-3 (1953).
., 309 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1957).
22,307 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1957).
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first impression in Colorado. The plaintiff had obtained a default judg-
ment against the defendant based upon a complaint, which-alleged
wanton, wilful and reckless disregard of the rights of others. The plain-
tiff presented no evidence at the hearing on the default judgment on
the issue of wanton and reckless disregard. In the meantime, the de-
fendant had obtained a discharge in bankruptcy. The supreme court
held that the discharge x 'as effective as against the judgment. The court
held that you must (1) present evidence of wantonness and recklessness,
and (2) the trial court must make a specific finding of recklessness be-
fore such a judgment will not be discharged in bankruptcy.
The importance of Noakes v. Gaiser, 21 is that the case leaves two
legal areas open to speculation. The case was affirmed on appeal by
operation of law since the court was equally divided. The justices who
affirmed wrote no opinion. Only two dissenting opinions were reported.
i1n -the first, Judge Holland indicates that "wilful and wanton conduct,"
as used in the automobile guest statute, is not actually "negligence."
If this were to become the opinion of the majority of the court, would
contributory negligence and assumption of risk be good defenses to
wilful and wanton conduct? In the second, .Judge Frantz, while admitting
that, "The overwhelming weight of authority sustains this type of leg-
islation (guest statute) on the theory that it finds sanction in the proper
exercise of the police power." argues persuasively that the guest statute
is unconstitutional. Is it possible that this dissenting opinion, may, at
some time in the future, become the opinion of the najority of the court?
The supreme court decided in Green v. Jones, 4 that a two-year-old
child was, as a matter of law, incapable of becoming a guest in an auto-
mobile driven by another. Concluding that the applicability of the
guest statute -2 depended upon the presence of two factors, namely, ex-
press or implied invitation and formal acceptance, the court judicially
noticed that the child was not capable of accepting an invitation.
AUTOMOBILE v. RAILROAD
Buchholz v. Union Pacific R.R.2 ; is a case in which the plaintiff's
father was killed when he drove the plaintiff's truck onto a railroad
track and was struck by the defendant's train. The father's view of the
track and train was severely limited by obstructions. There was evidence
that a signal light was not working properly, although the father had
stopped before driving upon the track. The supreme court affirmed
the trial court's direction of a verdict in favor of the defendant railroad
on both the plaintiff's claim and the defendant railroad's counterclaim.
The majority imposed a high degree of' care on the part of the driver of
an automobile when he approaches a railroad track, especially when
the view of the track is obstructed, possibly necessitating that the driver
get out of the car and look up the track if he is not sure. The dissenting
opinion pointed out that if there was a duty imposed upon the plaintiff,
there was an equal duty imposed upon the defendant railroad company
since the defendant knew that a sixty-mile an hour train passing over
heavily travelled highways through a small town creates a dangerous
situation.
23 315 P.2d 183 (Colo. 1957).
'4 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 113 (1957).
2;, Colo. ]Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-9-1 (1953).
26 311 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1957).
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In Union Pacific R.R. v. Cogburn,2 7 the plaintiff's automobile, with
its lights on, plunged headlong into the side of a box car blocking a
highway crossing at night. The train to which the boxcar was connected
had blocked the highway for some time. The supreme court reversed
the trial court and directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, because
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The court
aligned itself with those courts which have held that the length of time a
train blocks a crossing is not determinative of the railroad's negligence
and further stated that there was no excuse in the law for not being
able to see a boxcar blocking a highway, unless conditions are so de-
ceptive that one cannot see a train at night by the aid of normal head-
lights. The court reiterated and affirmed the "assured vision rule," stated
in Ridenour v. Diffee,2s that it is negligence, as a matter of law, to drive
an automobile at such speed that it is not possible to stop within the
distance illuminated by headlights. 20
AUTO v. AUTO"0
In Jacobsen v. McGinness3' the supreme court held that a person
driving fifty miles an hour who enters a cloud of dust created by a
vehicle moving ahead in the same direction is guilty of negligence as a
matter of law, if he ends up on the wrong side of the road and collides
with another car.
Kendall Transport v. Jungck32 severely limited the application of
Bennett v. Hall,33 a case in which the court had held that the plaintiff
on a through highway was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law, by stating:
"That decision was by a divided court with two judges not
participating, and the result there obtained, to say the least,
strained to the utmost the generally accepted rule that this court
will not disturb the findings of court or jury on the question
of ...contributory negligelce.
34
This decision is sound in view of the harshness of the earlier case.
AUTO V. PEDESTRIAN
Only two points raised in Judd v. Aragon 35 need to be commented
on. First, the court adopted section 479 of the Restatement of Torts, in
its entirety, on the doctrine of last clear chance. Second, the court stated
that, "Defendant's headlights were on low beam, as requied by law."
But, in Union Pacific R.R. v. Cogburn, the court stated:
"There was no law requiring plaintiff to have his headlights focused
27 315 P.2d 209 (Colo. 1957).
"s 133 Colo. 467, 297 P.2d 280 (1956).
29 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4-98 (1953) provides that headlights should illuminate
350 feet on high beam and 100 feet on low beam.
30 See Peterson v. Kessler, 308 P.2d 610 (Colo. 1957) (holding that it is a question
of fact whether a fellow who admits visibility is "nil" and who runs into another party
is guilty of negligence); Jacobsen v. McGinness, discussed infra, which apparently
holds that such conduct is negligence as a matter of law: Smith v. Brase, 309 P.2d
1006 (Colo. 1957), which holds that an instruction on the emergency doctrine, to be
correct, must exclude emeigencies created by the negligence of the person confronted
with the emergency.
31311 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1957).
32 316 P.2d 1052 (Colo. 1957).
33 132 Colo. 419, 290 P.2d 241 (1955).
.4 316 P.2d at 1053.
35 316 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1957).
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low, common sense would dictate that under the conditions as he de-
scribed them, his lights should have been bright."36
Dennis v. Johnson17 held that a pedestrian jay walking across a
street was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Only one previous
Colorado case, Fabling v. Jones,38 has so held. The court further held
that an instruction of last clear chance could not be given to a jury
unless "subsequent" negligence of the defendant be shown, i.e., negli-





In Beadles v. Metayka40 the plaintiff was placed on an operating
table in the defendant's hospital and defendant anesthetist had rendered
plaintiff unconscious. The plaintiff was propped on his side by a hospi-
tal orderly at the order of the surgeon and he promptly fell off the
table when all parties had their backs turned. Judgments against the
surgeon and in favor of the defendant anesthetist and hospital were
affirmed on appeal. The court held (1) that the surgeon's responsibility
begins when he first asserts control in the operating room which point
may be somewhat flexible in time, but if he does assert control over a
hospital orderly, the surgeon is liable for his negligence and not the
hospital; and (2) the negligence of an anesthetist is a question of fact
for the jury, although the court admitted that under prevalent practice,
an anesthetist has a duty to make chart entries and of necessity this
diverts attention from the patient. Whether the anesthetist was an inde-
pendent contractor was left undecided.
MISCELLANEOUS CASES
New Brantner Extension Ditch Co. v. Ferguson4 holds that before
a person who builds a dam can be liable for damage caused by its
overflow, he must be shown to have been negligent. Unless there is
a distinction between a dam and a reservoir, this case has apparently
overruled the absolute liability doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands4 which
had been followed in several early Colorado cases.
4
1
In City of Boulder v. Burns44 plaintiff sustained injuries when she
fell, outside of the city limits, into a pit maintained for a water meter
36 315 P.2d at 216.
37 317 P.2d 890 (Colo. 1957).
3s 180 Colo. 144, 114 P.2d 1100 (1941); cf. Pueblo Transportation Company v. Moylan.
123 Colo. 207, 226 P.2d 806 (1951).
39 Davis v. Bonebrake, 313 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1957), involved a fact situation in which
a sponge or similar material was left in the abdomen of the plaintiff after an opera-
tion. An important procedural dispute arose between the majority and dissenting
opinion. The upshot of the majcrity opinion is that there are times when fraud need
not be plead with particularity, although seemingly required by Rule 9 of the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure.
40 311 P.2d 711, 34 DICTA 351 (Colo. 1957).
41 307 P.2d 479 (Colo. 1957).
42 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 7.7, rev'd L.R. 1 Ex. 265, aff'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
43 Canon City and Cripple Creek R.R. v. Oxtoby, 45 Colo. 214, 100 Pac. 1127
.(1908), Garnett Ditch and Reservoir Co. v. Sampson, 48 Colo. 285, 110 Pac. 79 (1910)
and Sylvester v. Jerome, 19 Cclo. 128, 24 Pac. 760 (183).
44 313 P,2d 712 (Colo. 1957).
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box. There was a lid over the box which was slightly awry, but the lid
and ground were covered with snow. She knew where the pit was, but
did not know the lid would tip when stepped on. The supreme court
affirmed the judgment in her favor and against the city. The court held
that the plaintiff was not negligent because she did not know that the
lid would tip, but more important, the court felt that even if she had
known the lid would tip, the question of her negligence would have
been for the jury. The court also stated that the reasonableness of plain-
tiff's choice of paths is a jury question. It should also be noted that the
city was considered to have had actual notice of the defect since the city
had constructed the pit and lid.
In Brighton v. DeGregorio5 the court attempted to straighten out
some of the confusion which arises in the attempted applications of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The case involved a broken float pin on a
toilet. In upholding the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's com-
plaint, the supreme court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
not applicable in a situation in which two equal and opposite inferences
may be drawn. In other words, an inference of negligence on the one
hand, or an inference of reasonable conduct on the other. To apply
the doctrine to the instant case, the court felt was incorrect because one
could infer either that the defendant should have prevented the pin
from breaking or that the defendant could not have reasonably foreseen
such an occurrence.
4. 314 P.2d 276 (Colo. 1957).
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